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Mission and Organization of CIA Clandestine Services

In my remarks that concerned the so-called overt side of CIA and in the remarks of several others who have talked to you on production of intelligence, you know that there exists this small ten to twenty-five percent of information that this government must have in order to provide intelligence to the policy makers so that they may come up with certain decisions that are consistent with national security, and that will forearm this country in its dealings in foreign affairs.

Now, not only is there need for this particularly vital information that is normally withheld from us by foreign governments but, as I have had occasion to say you collect certain information and secret though it may be, activity does not stop there. If, for example, it is learned through clandestine information gathering techniques, that a certain country is about to engage in some secret warfare activity in another part of the world, if it pertains to the national security of this government, something has to be done. The policy makers simply do not say, "Well, that's an interesting piece of information. We will file it, and we will read the N. Y. Times and be concerned with what is going on in other parts of the world and we will do nothing else." That is not the case. On the basis of information that is collected and that information which is of a particularly sensitive nature and would require some action, then you may be sure that some action is taken in one form or another. And that is where CIA comes into the

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picture in many significant respects.

Now I'm not only going to ask you to look at the charts that you have before you, but also at Public Law #253 that you've heard discussed frequently and which some of you have been somewhat concerned about.

As you know, Public Law 253 is that one that has as its short title the National Security Act of 1947 and that is the legislation responsible for the setting up not only of the National Security Council and other bodies of the government in the executive branch, but also CIA. On page four of that act you see stated there the five major functions or duties that are to be undertaken by this Agency. They are the significant items so far as we are concerned here. And it reads, "For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities in several government departments and agencies, in the interest of national security it shall be the duty of the agency under the direction of the National Security Council:

1. "To advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the government departments and agencies as relate to national security." So that the first function assigned to this agency is that of acting as the advisory body to the NSC in matters that pertain to the intelligence activities of this government. That automatically assigns a major and rather centralized function of this agency so far as intelligence is concerned.

2. Secondly, the legislation gives to this agency the right "to make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of such intelligence

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activities of the departments and agencies of the government as relate to the national security". So that's one step beyond the advisory function. It states specifically that recommendations may be made for the purpose of coordination.

3. Third, and very importantly, this business of correlation, and as it reads here "To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and provide for the dissemination of such intelligence within the government, using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities." Very clearly there you see that this agency is not to duplicate the efforts of other agencies of the government having intelligence functions. Rather it is assigned the job of correlating and evaluating and disseminating that intelligence which relates to the national security. Now you may say that all intelligence of one sort or another or in one way or another has to do with the national security. That is so.

However, there is the peculiar difference and distinction you might say between what is literally departmental intelligence and national intelligence. It may be that the Office of Naval Intelligence through means at hand, learns of certain submarine building techniques that are currently being used in the Soviet Union and that is first of all a matter of peculiar concern to the Dept. of the Navy and rightly so. The first interest lies there. Now if it is understood by the NSC in their deliberations that the naval efforts of the Soviet Union are very important and impinge upon this whole subject of national security, foreign policy and what have you, then, the piecing of that information that was originally collected let us say by the Navy Dept., the piecing

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of that into the total framework of the potentialities and capabilities and to some extent the intentions of the Soviet Union, it will be the job of the Central Intelligence Agency to correlate that with respect to all other information that this agency and other agencies of the government may have. The exceptions to this rule are stated also that the agency shall have no police subpoena or law enforcement powers or internal security functions. That is of course rather obvious that we should be prohibited from engaging in such activities but recall that at the time that legislation was enacted and at the time prior to that there was very grave concern that a centralized intelligence group or agency might get out of hand and start indulging in activities that would be an inimical to the democratic interests of this government and the people as a whole. So, to be sure that there would be nothing that would go astray and to quiet the fears of those that were concerned (and I think legitimately so), they added this provision here.

Then there is the further provision, and it is the important one also, that the departments, and other agencies of the government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence. This agency does not abridge the activities of G-2, ONI, OIR, and A-2. You have had discussions on that point so there is no need to handle that further. Very importantly there is stated in this third function that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. You remember that during the political campaign General Smith was in the position at that time of having to discuss with certain Congressional Committees very sensitive information. Not only

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then but before that too, and it was an embarrassing situation because such information as he might have as they were interested in he could not reveal the sources of the information and he should not have, and he did not do so. And he was within his rights because the revelation of the sources of the information that an intelligence agency might use is certainly one of the most sensitive matters that we can be involved in. So here it is that the DCI is specifically told or required not to reveal and is responsible for protecting intelligence sources.

Well, provisions one, two, and three are those that relate to much of the material that has so far been presented to you in this whole business of the so-called "overt" functions of this agency. Now we are coming more into this so-called clandestine mission of CIA and where do we find our authority for engaging in such activity and performing such a mission? Actually it would stem from items four and five. If you want to be specific and say just what does empower this agency to do thus and so you can point to four and five and as you know from D<sub>1</sub>.

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[REDACTED] lectures, he stated that there is no actual provision in this legislation to the effect that CIA will engage in the clandestine collection efforts. But number four rather clearly indicates the possibility because it is stated that we are to perform for the benefit of existing intelligence agencies such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally. There you in effect have it. It is not efficient for the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, for Treasury, for the host of government agencies to send personnel that are trained in clandestine techniques, to send them abroad under a variety of

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called unorthodox activities, activities which could not be admitted publicly by any member of this organization. It is apparently quite allright for John Gunther and Constantine Brown and various editorialists in the Washington Post and all these people that are suddenly getting interested in CIA, it's allright for them to say that we've hacked here and we've hashed there and that we've done this and done that and we've done the other thing and that we do this and do that rather well or badly. What their sources of information may be I do not know but maybe they are good guessers. Maybe they have some means of knowing - I don't know. In any event, those people can say what they want; you cannot. It may seem odd but it is the fact that as officials of this Agency you are not in a position either to deny or to affirm activities that may be published in the newspapers.

Now before looking at that chart, let us say that this is going to be somewhat unsatisfactory to you - those of you who are new. To those of you who have been in the Agency for quite a while (and there are several of you) this is an old story. But somehow or other it is the accepted belief that the status that is CIA shall not be unveiled all at once but gradually. It is, frankly, a security concept. You will get in considerable detail at a later stage in your training the complete breakdown of this organization but remember again that the structure of an intelligence organization is extremely sensitive information, any description of it. Because even the names of certain parts may reveal the type of activity though all the little fine points and all the little branches and sections and pieces of offices may not be listed on any chart that the opposition might obtain. Nevertheless the titles that would be given could indicate the type of activity that we are officially engaged in and which we can

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not publicly admit. So this is rather sensitive and as you have need for information it will be given to you. It is sufficient, however, for our purposes here to discuss the DD/P complex in rather general terms. This is no reflection on your sense of security. It is simply a statement that as you need to know information you will get it. For our purposes here we can discuss it rather generally.

Well, looking at your chart: The DD/P complex stands as I said, for the clandestine side of CIA. Under the Deputy Director for Plans is the Chief of Operations who acts as his deputy, as you know. Now, although it doesn't show it on the charts, I'll explain a couple of other boxes that would fit into that general orbit that surrounds the DD/P. He has an executive secretariat which is his own personal staff and which does much of the paper work at the very top level there for him and which can get a bird's eye view down into all the operations and activities that go on under the DD/P. He has also an Inspection and Review Staff. There's one person here who will take part in that activity. I will shortly make mention of that; it isn't pertinent right at this time. There is also a Plans and Programs Coordination Staff at this very top level and that again assists the Deputy Director for Plans in overall coordination of the activity that goes on underneath him. The activity is so complex and is so extremely diversified that you need top level staffs that are immediately responsible to the DD/P himself who will keep him advised of everything that is going on. So you see

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read TSS, and ADMIN - Administration. That is the functional level. In

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